Evolution of banking structure by Chang, Yoonhee Tina
   
 1 
  
   
                                         
 
Evolution of Banking Structure: Industrial Policy and 
Deregulation 
 
by 
 
Yoonhee Tina Chang 
 
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia 
 
CCP Working Paper 06-4 
 
Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of various types of deregulation on 
banking industry structure. The empirical result is supported by evidence from Japan 
and Korea, which have undergone a substantial consolidation following a series of 
deregulation. The analysis is applied to a unique data set of the entire commercial 
banking sector in Japan and Korea, which covers both pre- and post- banking crisis 
periods. The paper also draws attention to the role of banking sector in the East Asian 
industrialisation, which influenced its idiosyncratic banking regulation and the 
evolution of the banking structure using the structure-performance relationship. 
December 2005 
 
JEL Classification: G21 ; G28 ; L13 ; L59 
Keywords: Banking Structure, Deregulation, Industrial Policy 
 
Acknowledgements: 
I am grateful for encouragement and many helpful comments from Keith Cowling, 
Jeremy Smith. I also wish to thank Andrew Oswald, Alan Roe, Roger Sugden, Mike 
Waterson, Myrna Wooders, and seminar participants at University of Warwick, 
University of Birmingham, Australian National University – APSEG and RSPAS, the 
6th SMYE, EARIE 2001, and EUNIP2001 for helpful comments and discussions on 
previous versions of this paper. The support of the Economic and Social Research 
Council (UK) is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are mine.  
 
Contact details: 
y.chang@uea.ac.uk, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK. www.ccp.uea.ac.uk  t: +44 (0) 1603 593715  f: + 44(0) 1603 
591622      
 ISSN  1745-9648 
 
   
 2 
  
   
1. Introduction 
Throughout the last decade, the East Asian banking industry has adopted a 
significantly more concentrated market structure. The number of banks in the region 
was substantially reduced via mergers and exits in the late 1990s. Japan has authorised 
only one new regional bank since 1976 whilst there were 5 large-scale mergers between 
nationwide banks and one revocation of the license in the 1990s. On the other hand, the 
banking structure in Korea took a slightly different path. Korea authorised 9 new 
nationwide banks and 3 transformations from specialty banks throughout the 
industrialisation in the 1980s and early 1990s. Then, Korea took a drastic turn with 9 
mergers between nationwide banks and 4 mergers between regional banks. This wave of 
mergers and exits has halved the number of nationwide banks in Japan and Korea from 
its peak as shown in Table 1, and the market share of the larger banks has grown. One 
may argue that the Japanese and Korean banks made a radical move towards 
consolidation to deal with their respective economic and financial crises since the 
consolidation seems to coincide with the post-crises period as shown in Figures 3 and 4.  
Traditionally, one of the main roles of these East Asian banks was a means of 
supporting the real sector in the process of pursuing economic development.1  However, 
when the East Asian financial crises in 1997 triggered the restructuring process of many 
industrial sectors in the region, the banking sector appeared to be an industry where 
restructuring was most urgently and seriously required. The 1997 financial crisis in Asia 
renewed recognition of the significance of the banking industry and its importance to 
the overall economy.  
Previous literature (Cerasi et al., 2002; Chiappori et al., 1995; Dewatripont and 
Maskin, 1995; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993) on bank structure has primarily focused 
on the impact of exogenous change in regulation and the subsequent change in 
competition environment without any consideration of industrial policy. The industrial 
policy in East Asia, which dominated banking sector regulation, had the objective of 
encouraging industrial development in the region. Therefore, the competition 
environment in the East Asian banking should not be investigated independently of its 
industrial policy.  
Banking regulation in Japan and Korea has included entry barriers, branching 
restrictions, and deposit rate ceilings. East Asian banking regulation was designed to 
facilitate the development of strategic industries as shown in Table 2. Japan and Korea 
have aimed to promote certain industries, which they believed to be strategically 
beneficial for the national economy. The target industries have varied from primary and 
light industries (food and textiles) in the 1950s and 1960s, to high-tech knowledge 
intensive industries in the 1990s. The deposit rate regulation, for instance, allowed 
banks to have access to cheap funding so that they could provide loans at lower rates to 
these strategic industries. With cheap funding via banks and with the help of 
government subsidies, the strategic industries could grow fast, generating supernormal 
profits and remained as high quality customers to banks. This kind of growth pattern 
continued in East Asia until they faced the recent economic crises.      
Not only have Japan and Korea led the economic growth in East Asia, but also other 
East Asian countries have replicated many of the development patterns set by Japan and 
                                                 
 
1
 Kim (1999) claims one of the reasons for recent financial crisis in Korea is basic functions of the 
financial industry being neglected such as credit screening, which led to higher non performing loans. 
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Korea.2 Moreover, the two countries have similarities in their industrial structure due to 
their strong trade networks.3 Since the modern banking system in Korea was established 
during the Japanese occupation, it seems natural that Korea followed the Japanese type 
of banking establishments. However, there is some evidence of divergence as well as 
convergence in terms of recent restructuring of the banking sector, especially with 
respect to adopting concentrated market structure as in Figures 3 to 6. For instance, the 
Korean banking structure has consolidated more immediately and drastically after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. One the other hand, the Japanese banking structure has 
reacted to the economic crisis in the early 1990s4 with some delays and the major 
banking consolidation took place only after 2000 with almost a decade delay. The 
difference in the restructuring is more notable when the two countries are compared in 
terms of regional banking as Japan does not appear to have implemented any measures 
for their regional banks.    
The main emphasis of this paper is to identify the determinants of banking structure 
in East Asia using empirical data from Japan and Korea. The recent consolidation in 
East Asian banking will be assessed with respect to industrial policy and regulation. 
This paper also investigates the role of Japanese and Korean banks in their respective 
industrialisation processes and how the changes in regulation affected the evolution of 
the market structure based on the structure-performance relationship.  
In section 2 reviewed the role of East Asian banks in industrialisation by comparing 
the evolution of the banking system with the country’s macroeconomic position. The 
uniqueness of this approach lies in the sense of inter-industry comparison between 
financial and non-financial industries using an industrial organisational framework. It is 
important to note that financial and non-financial industries have different attributes and 
therefore, it is interesting to investigate how they have evolved together. 
The consequences of the regulation and deregulation on entry, branching and deposit 
rates were empirically investigated. The different types of regulation and deregulation 
are defined and separately analysed from a country specific perspective. The 
relationship between concentration (Structure) and the degree of competition (Conduct) 
in Japan and Korea is examined. The effects of deregulation on the structure of the 
banking industry and the profitability (Performance) of banks are tested.  The evolution 
of banking industry in the two countries is compared and shows evidence of divergence 
in the restructuring process of the banking sector between Japan and Korea.   
 
 
2. East Asian Banking and Industrialisation in Context  
In the post war period, East Asian Governments actively promoted heavy and 
chemical industries and some academics like Cho (1994) and Castley (1997) argued that 
the financial sector was lagging behind the fast-developing real sector.  Moreover, the 
pattern of fast growth in the real sector and the lagging financial sector was common in 
                                                 
2
 World Bank data categorise Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand as East Asia. However, Japan and Korea dominated the regional economy and its 
growth representing 78-90% of East Asian GNP (constant market price 1995, in US dollars) over the 
period 1960-1997. Their contribution to the regional growth has been more than 80%, which fell down to 
50-60% in the 1990s. 
3
 Castley (1997) showed Japanese influence on Korea’s industrialisation in detail.  
4
 Kanaya and Woo (2000) discusses the Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s, in particular the collapse of 
the asset bubble in the early 1990s.  
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all East Asian countries.  In particular, the similarities between Japan and Korea were 
significant due to their strong trade networks.   
It is fair to say that the Korean industrialisation process followed that of Japan with a 
time lag of almost a decade. This overlapping transfer of industrial structures from 
Japan to Korea was explained by the Japanese relocation process, which started in the 
late 1960s. In Table 2, Korea shows a general pattern of catching up with the Japanese 
industrial policy a decade after.  
Ishii (1997) claimed the reason for the high growth rate in East Asia was its high rate 
of savings.  Even in the 1980s the rate of savings of the household economy in Japan 
was around 17%, which was twice as much as those in the advanced Western countries.  
It is true that the high rate of savings in East Asia is one of the common factors for its 
fast growth. However, the role of banks in the process of allocating the funds into 
appropriate industries and enterprises should not be overlooked.  As Ishii (1997) pointed 
out for Japan, the main part of the funds for industrialisation in East Asia was not 
procured directly from the capital market but supplied indirectly through various kinds 
of banks, and the respective central banks provided these banks with funds if necessary.  
Cho (1994) explains that the East Asian Governments were heavily involved in the 
direction of savings fund to achieve development goals in the real sector. 
Industrialisation in East Asia has not only meant a transformation of an agrarian 
economy into an industrial economy, but it also means a more focused industrial 
development in strategic industries such as heavy industries. Thus, the financial sector 
has never developed independently of the real sector in East Asia. More importantly, the 
industrial policy dominated financial sector developments leaving the banking sector 
subordinate to the real sector.    
With the increasing importance of East Asian economy in the global context, Japan 
and Korea have experienced significant pressure from outside on market liberalisation 
in the both real and financial sectors. Japan faced the pressure earlier than Korea as the 
Japanese presence in the global organisation predated that of Korea. Requests for 
eliminating tariff and non-tariff trade barriers were one of the most common pressures 
in the real sector, whereas the liberalisation of interest rates and mobility of capital were 
often required by global institutions such as IMF, World bank and OECD. For instance, 
the OECD entry condition for Korea included capital market liberalisation.5  
Therefore, the East Asian Governments started to lose their tight control over 
industrial policy and banking operation. Large enterprises increased their activities 
overseas both in production and financing in the wake of globalisation and domestic 
economies in East Asia were left behind. Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) explain a case 
of strategic failure about a hollowing out of Japanese industry caused by the relocation 
of Keiretsus and other multinationals.6  
When the Japanese bubble burst in 1990 and the banking crisis followed a year after, 
mergers between banks were recommended. However, the Keiretsus were the main 
hurdle to both large-scale mergers and massive corporate restructuring as city banks in 
Japan were at the core of respective Keiretsus. These large business groups, Keiretsus, 
had cross-shareholdings with the group banks, which has worked in favour of industrial 
                                                 
5
 Korea had to comply with the minimum requirements set by ‘OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements and Current Invisible Operations’  
6
 ‘Hollowing out’ as a result of outward FDI (foreign direct investment) when the domestic cost base 
increases.   
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policy during the fast growing period. However, when the real sector started to 
deteriorate, the Keiretsu holdings in the city banks proved to be a substantial obstacle.7  
The Korean case is somewhat different, as there is no large group bank publicly 
known, tied via cross-shareholdings. However, the strong long-term relationship 
between certain banks and Chaebols, which are the Korean version of Keiretsus, turned 
out to be a problem after the recent crisis. Despite the absence of group banks, the loan 
portfolio of Korean banks was concentrated on a small number of Chaebols.8  
 
3. Background Literature 
There has been much research to explain the causes of Korea’s economic growth and 
many attribute Korea’s growth to the strong industrial policy adopted by the 
Government. In order to finance this industrial policy, the Korean banking system was 
reorganised.9 Cho (1994) explains that the reason the Korean banking system was under 
tight government control was to aid strategic investments to finance development plans. 
East Asian Governments promoted a group of strategic industries as listed in Table 2 
and regulation was designed to direct the money flow to such target industries.10  
On the other hand, macroeconomists often discuss the optimal mix of government 
policies to explain economic growth in a country. In particular, the recent crisis in Asia 
brought more attention to the role of monetary policy in an economy.11 However, the 
economic success in East Asia may have more to do with the credibility of hands-on 
development policy in the private sector alongside monetary policy. The liquidity for 
the development was provided and the fund flows were carefully directed to the 
strategic industries. The signal of Government’s intention was clear and credible to the 
private sector via announced development plans without any policy inconsistency. 12                                                                                                                                         
Given the special attributes of banking industry, the theory of financial 
intermediation indicates measuring the both quantity output and quality of banks is not 
as straightforward as for non-financial firms.  In addition to the intangible nature of 
banking output, it is difficult to account for quality in banking service.13 Heffernan 
(1996), Klein (1971) and Clark (1988) discussed the relevant concepts of bank output 
and input. 14  Despite the importance of commercial banking as a major financial 
intermediary, there has been little consensus as to what constitutes a workable and 
productive theory of the banking firm. Klein (1971) claims that neo-classical 
microeconomic analysis is rarely used to explain bank behaviour, primarily because 
there is so little agreement concerning even the most fundamental concepts. In the face 
                                                 
7
 Tsutsui (1999) explains the obstacles faced by Keiretsus and the group banks in detail. 
8
 It appears to be bilateral oligopoly suggested by Waterson (1984) using Galbraith (1954) examples in 
American Capitalism.   
9
 The importance of the banks’ role in financing this industrial policy is well documented in ‘Financial 
System in Korea (1998)’ published by The Bank of Korea.  
10
 Castley (1997) explains the industrialisation process in East Asia as a form of ladder where each rung 
has to be scaled before moving on to the next. His illustration of the ladder is simplified as 1/ Pre-industry 
with primary products, 2/ Labour-intensive industries, 3/ Capital-intensive industries, and 4/ Knowledge 
or technology-intensive industries. 
11
 Agenor et al (1999) laid out excellent models for monetary policy and macroeconomic aspects of 
financial sector in order to explain the recent Asian financial crisis.  
12
 Castley (1997) lists suggested causes for East Asian economic success including consistent 
macroeconomic policies,  high rates of investment, command economy through government intervention, 
total commitment of regime to economic growth.   
13
 See Gordon (1990) for hedonic price adjustment.   
14
 They define loans and deposits as output and input respectively.  
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of conceptual difficulties in drawing the analogy between a bank and the typical firm of 
neo-classical analysis. 
Among various competition models in banking, Gehrig (1996) and Matutes and 
Vives (1996; 2000) included monopolistic competition with horizontal and vertical 
product differentiation, where the equivalent quality parameter is the degree of 
branching. However, the weakness of the monopolistic competition approach is the lack 
of empirical evidence, given the imperfect nature of the industry. There are information 
gaps among borrowers and lenders and imperfect information lies at the centre of 
banking sector dynamics. Freixas and Rochet (1997) explain that intermediaries in the 
brokerage market, including banking, can affect their trading probabilities by 
establishing an information and communication network. As communication 
possibilities across potential traders are imperfect, Freixas and Rochet (1997) claim that, 
several firms, not one, will offer similar or identical intermediary services. Gehrig 
(1996) shows that the structure of financial markets is usually fairly concentrated with a 
few large firms and monopolistic competition market conditions will not be present.  
On the other hand, Klein (1971) assumed that banks maximise profits in the course 
of the intermediation activity and thus, the microeconomic analysis of banks has been 
influenced by industrial organisation theory.  This led to the development of banking 
competition models and to empirical studies based on methods developed for industrial 
economics. Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) considered a bank as a firm maximising its 
net present value of assets and established a landmark model of banking.  
Among other competition models in banking, Repullo (1995) and Chiappori et al. 
(1995) applied horizontal differentiation to banking. In these models, the main 
difference between banks and non-financial firms is that banks compete in two markets 
instead of one, i.e. deposits and loans markets. However, they assume that under 
perfectly competitive interbank market conditions complete independence of the two 
activities of the bank can be obtained. The predictions of these models are that banking 
industries should be fragmented, and market shares should be symmetrically distributed. 
On the other hand, Gehrig (1996) and Matutes and Vives (1996; 2000), introduce 
network externalities to explain how asymmetric configurations in market share could 
arise in banking. This asymmetric information paradigm has emerged as a mainstream 
approach for recent banking analyses.  
The traditional approach to early empirical studies of banking was based on the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. 15  Bain (1951) supposed a one-way 
linear relationship of causality, which runs from structure (the level of concentration) to 
conduct (the degree of collusion or competition), and then to performance 
(profitability). Therefore the structure of an industry is important to the understanding 
of its performance. However, the application of SCP paradigm has been subject to 
considerable criticism as it neglected feedback. Cowling (1976) suggests the structure-
performance relationship be a recursive system of feedback with substantial lags. 
Berger (1995) also questioned the results obtained following the SCP paradigm. Despite 
the criticism, the SCP paradigm provided the foundation for the study of market 
structure.  
In general, the banking industry is highly concentrated. Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) 
and Clark (1988) explained the concentration in banking industry with economies of 
scale and scope. Economies of scale in banking and financial intermediation allow 
                                                 
15
 Baltensperger (1972), Gilbert (1984) and Hannan (1991) used the SCP paradigm.  
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banks to exercise market power or to pre-empt potential rivals’ entry. Although banking 
systems tend to be quite concentrated, in some developed countries, the United States 
shows a fragmented structure.16 However, this fragmentation exists primarily as a result 
of regulation on inter-state branching designed to deal with their concern about financial 
power.    
Game theory provides another useful approach for analysing banking competition. 
When banks are to maximise their profits under SCP paradigm, the market structure can 
be investigated under a two stage game theoretic model. Banks can play two different 
games, competing in prices or quantities. As an example of price competition, banks 
enter the market with sunk costs. The exogenous sunk cost such as capital requirement 
to open a bank is a fixed set-up cost as it is fixed by an entry regulation and only varies 
in the presence of change in regulation. The endogenous sunk cost of branching is a 
variable set-up cost, which is considered to be a parameter for an escalation mechanism 
in vertical product differentiation in banking.17 A similar application to internet bank 
networks is feasible.      
Chiappori et al. (1995) derived the equilibrium number of banks under various 
regulatory conditions and suggested the equilibrium number of banks under regulation 
is larger than that under free market condition but none of them is socially optimal. 
Cerasi et al. (2002) also looked at the impact of deregulation on concentration and 
branch networks in European banking. Since deregulation reduces profits for a given 
branching network, fewer firms find it profitable to enter the industry and therefore the 
degree of concentration rises. On the other hand when the banks collude, they establish 
a smaller network compared with competition as opening new branches damages rivals 
by stealing their clients. By coordination, they will avoid this damage. However, her 
empirical analysis shows the weakness in explaining the feedback process of structure-
performance relation.  
 
4. Empirical Analyses of the Banking Structure in Japan and Korea 
In a concentrated industry, there exist economies of scale and thus higher profits are 
expected under a concentrated market structure. The rationale behind this prediction is 
that in a concentrated industry, firms behave as oligopolists, earning high profits.  
However, the SCP paradigm is not always justified if the strategic behaviour of firms is 
taken into account. For instance, there are barriers to entry where banks can act together 
collusively against new entries.  One other point, which is missed out in the SCP 
paradigm is the feedback that the higher the profits, the greater the number of firms that 
enter the industry and thus lower the level of concentration.  This feedback is 
exemplified within the regulatory framework. Tougher competition leads to lower 
profits and thus many firms are driven out of the industry and hence raises 
concentration. 
There have been studies on the impact of deregulation on the structure of the banking 
industry, but most of them focused on EEC banking industries and there are no studies 
on East Asian banking. Given the peculiarity of industrial policy and the role of banks 
in East Asia, it is worth trying to estimate the impact of deregulation on concentration 
and the structure of banking industry in Japan and Korea. The process of deregulation 
                                                 
16
 See Macey (2001) and Calomiris (1997).  
17
 Sutton (1991, 1998) laid out a model of sunk cost and market structure and discusses extensively on 
escalation mechanism and the market structure. 
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since 1979 in Japan and since 1988 in Korea provides the natural framework to assess 
this impact, especially when the process accelerated following the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997.          
 
4.1 The Data 
In order to test the predictions of SCP paradigm with modification for feedback, a set 
of variables for Structure (concentration), Conduct (branching and pricing) and 
Performance (profitability) were chosen and the relevant indices computed with respect 
to the strategic variable, deposits.18 The number of branches per bank measured the size 
of the branch network. Finally, three dummy variables were used to capture the effect of 
different types of deregulation: 1/ deregulation of deposit interest rates; 2/ deregulation 
of branching restriction, and 3/deregulation of cross-financial sector entry.     
The time-series data in aggregate for both Japan and Korea were constructed using 
22 nationwide banks and 64 regional banks in Japan (86 banks) and 18 nationwide 
banks and 10 regional banks in Korea (28 banks). Hence the panel of all 114 
commercial banks in the two countries over the 28 year period from 1976 to 2003 were 
used in the calculation of the time-series data for the analyses. However, one should 
note that this data set has only time-series features as panel attributes are lost when 
calculating the market structure variables in aggregate. When a bank changes its name 
after restructuring, it was recorded as a new entry in the data set. Changes in the number 
of commercial banks in Japan and Korea are shown in Table 1 with a substantial 
number of mergers. 
These two countries are chosen for several reasons: 1/ the times series data are not 
readily available for the entire set of commercial banks in other countries in the region; 
2/ the available data are more reliable compared to those of other countries’ banks; 3/ 
the banking sector in Japan and Korea have undergone a substantial consolidation; 4/ 
both countries have implemented progressive deregulation in the banking sector, and 
finally 5/ the industry restructuring in Japan and Korea are often replicated in other 
newly industrialised countries (NIEs) and the restructuring of the banking sector is no 
exception.     
For both countries, the data for all commercial banks were aggregated into time-
series instead of panel. The Japanese data were collected from the Bank of Japan (BOJ 
hereafter) and Japanese Bankers Association (Zenginkyo hereafter) publications and the 
Korean data came from the Bank of Korea (BOK), Financial Supervisory Services 
(FSS) and Maekyung-Annual Corporation reports.  
The classification of deposit institutions set by the respective central banks is used. 
The econometric model is tested on commercial banks (i.e. nationwide city banks and 
regional banks), as foreign bank branches and specialised banks do not participate in the 
majority of competitive activities given the prevailing regulation. Moreover, city and 
regional banks represent nearly 50% of the deposit market and they are the ones that 
compete in the more realistic sense.  
 
4.2 Description of Variables 
 The variables are classified into three groups following the SCP paradigm. The level 
of concentration, market size and branch concentration were included in Structure as 
shown in the dependent variable section in Table 5. Deposit and loan rates are taken as a 
                                                 
18
 I assume the strategic objective of a bank is to compete for deposits in the market. Hence, I use deposits 
as the strategic variable.  
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proxy for price and the average branching as a proxy for quantity.19 These price and 
quantity proxy variables were included in Conduct. Return on deposits was included in 
Performance. The conduct and performance measures are shown as independent 
variables in Table 5. Variables included in the 3 groups are discussed in further details 
hereunder.     
There are various ways to measure concentration (CNCt). However, a logit 
transformation of C5t (n-firm concentration ratio of top 5 banks in year t) is used to 
avoid the problem of an upper limit of C5t=1 and to maintain an identical distribution of 
residuals at all values of market size.20 An n-firm concentration ratio, C5t, for top 5 
banks is calculated21 by aggregating market shares of top five banks in the deposit 
market for year t.22 Sutton (1991) has been using the logit transformation for some time, 
which was subsequently adopted by others like Cerasi and Daltung (2000). For those 
who are not familiar with this type of transformation, the conventional Hirschman 
Herfindal Indices (HHIt) were also used for comparison, although I do not expect to find 
much difference in results as shown in Figure 3 and 4.  
 
 
5
5
ln
1
t
t
t
CCNC
C
 
=  
− 
 (1) 
 
The deposit market size (MKSt) was computed in index form in order to deflate for 
changes in prices and currency devaluation. The total deposit size includes local 
currency deposits in current, savings and time deposit accounts at city and regional 
banks, i.e. ordinary banks.23    
 
 ln tt
t
Total Deposit SizeMKS
GNP
 
=  
 
 (2) 
 
The size of the branch network is also calculated in index form for the whole market 
taking the number of branches per bank.  
 ln tt
t
Total number of branchesAVB
Number of banks
 
=  
 
 (3) 
 
Branch concentration (BCNCt) is computed in index form as well taking a 
logarithmic ratio of the number of branches operated by top five banks over total 
number of branches ( 5tBC ). 24 
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 Banks expand their branch networks to gain market share in both deposits and loans.   
20
 Here, the deposit market size follows the same definition as used for the variable MKSt, i.e. all the local 
currency deposits in current, savings and time deposit accounts at city and regional banks. 
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 For multi-market conglomerate mergers and market shares, see Mueller (1985).  
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 The deposit size data were taken from ‘Bank Management Statistics’ published by FSS for Korea and 
‘Analysis of Financial Statement of All Banks’ published by Zenginkyo for Japan.   
24
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Interest rates on deposits (IRDt)25 and loans (IRLt)26  were directly taken without 
transformation as IRDt and IRLt are already normalised with respect to the size of 
deposits by taking the weighted average of market interest rates.27  For the performance 
measure, Return on deposits (RODt) was computed as a ratio of net profits over total 
deposits.28 It is important to note that the performance measure cannot be simply the 
interest margin. Return on deposits (RODt) is a measure of banks’ soundness as non-
accrual interests and provisions for non-performing loans were taken into account. 
Therefore, return on deposits (RODt) should definitely be distinguished from interest 
margins.  
In addition to 3 groups of variables, 3 deregulation dummy variables used in the 
analysis: D1t for deregulation on deposit interest rates, D2t for deregulation of branching 
restriction, and D3t for deregulation on cross-financial sector entry. Banking licenses in 
East Asia were initially given out for banking operations only exclusively. However, the 
deregulation of cross-financial sector entry allowed banks to enter other financial 
business areas such as securities trading and insurance sales.  
These dummy variables take a progressive form based on the gradual deregulation 
processes, between 0 and 1, with 0 being complete regulation versus 1 being complete 
deregulation. As deregulation on interest rates in Japan and Korea was carried out in a 
progressive way as shown in Table 3 and 4, the relative magnitude of deregulation 
impact was determined according to local authorities statements, which imply the first 
stage of deregulation has more weight than the rest. For instance, D1t =1 means 
complete deregulation on interest rates in 1995 for Korea, whereas D1t=0.5 represents 
deregulation is only half way through the process as described in Table 5. Figure 13 
illustrates the progressive deregulation on deposit interest rates whilst Figures 14 shows 
a one-off deregulation of branch restriction in Japan in contrast to the full restriction on 
branching in Korea. For the deregulation of cross-financial sector entry, Figure 15 
illustrates a one off deregulation in Korea and a two-stage deregulation in Japan.   
Finally, in order to investigate the impact of size distribution of market concentration 
and compare the results from nationwide banking with those from regional banking, the 
Hirschman Herfindal Indices (HHIt) were calculated and scaled by 100 for:29 1/ all 
                                                 
25
 For Korea, indicative interest rate on time deposits for more than 1 year and less than 2 years (but 
effective for 1 year or more before Dec. 5, 1988) published by BOK is used, where the rate is an average 
weighted by amount from 1996. For Japan, the rate is an average weighted by amount for total deposits 
published by Zenginkyo.  
26
 For Korea, indicative interest rate on loans of general funds up to 1 year for general enterprises at the 
end of period, where the rate is an average weighted by loan of banking funds from 1996. For Japan, the 
rate is an average weighted by amount for total loans published by Zenginkyo. 
27
 IRDt and IRLt are taken from ‘Money and Banking’ published by BOK for Korea 
(http://ecos.bok.or.kr/) and ‘Analysis of Financial Statement of All Banks’ published by Zenginkyo for 
Japan. 
28
 No logarithmic transformation is taken, as the distribution of residuals is normal with the simple ratio 
form.  
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commercial banks (HHIt); 2/ nationwide banks (HHINt), and 3/ regional banks (HHIRt). 
One could argue that the HHIt is more effective measures for market concentration as it 
intrinsically gives weight to both number of firms in the market and their market share 
distribution.   
 
4.3 The Econometric Model 
An econometric model is tested in a SCP paradigm framework using two-stage least 
squares (TSLS) of a system of simultaneous equations:  
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, where k=1,2,3 for three deregulation dummy variables.30  
 
Equations 5 and 6 use one of the most general forms of specification.  They are 
designed to detect the effects of deposit market size (MKSt), lagged interest rates on 
deposits and loans (IRDt-1 and IRLt-1), average branch network size (AVBt), lagged 
return on deposit (ROD
 t-1), lagged concentration (CNCt-1 in eqn. 5; BCNCt-1 in eqn. 6), 
and three types of deregulation (D1t , D2t, and D3t) on the banking concentration (CNCt 
in eqn. 5; BCNCt in eqn. 6). 
On the other hand, Equation 7 takes a form that is simplified by dropping lagged 
interest rate variables as banks do not consider the level of market interest rates as 
strategic reasons to expand their branch network size. Equation 7 explains the effects of 
deposit market size (MKSt), branch concentration (BCNCt), lagged return on deposit 
(ROD
 t-1), lagged average branch network size (AVBt-1), and three types of deregulation 
(D1t , D2t, and D3t) on average branch network size (AVBt). One should note that I use 
two-stage least squares (TSLS) given the endogeneity between AVBt, CNCt, and 
BCNCt.   
This is a dynamic model, which corrects the weakness of the traditional SCP 
paradigm assumption of a one-way flow of causality. 31  In order to incorporate a 
                                                                                                                                               
29
 All three HHIt, HHINt, and HHIRt are obtained by e.g. 
2
1
100
n
it
i
t
s
HHI ==
∑
 
30
 All three equations are identified as they pass both order and rank conditions. Deregulation on 
branching restriction (D2t) is excluded for Korea, as the restriction has not yet been relaxed in Korea. 
 
31
 Cowling (1976), Strickland & Weiss (1976) and Sutton (1991) pointed out this weakness of SCP 
paradigm and suggested various alternative methods.  Cowling suggested a recursive model and 
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feedback feature, interest rates on deposits and loans were taken in lagged forms of one 
year (IRDt-1 and IRLt-1). Effective business plans of most East Asian banks are made on 
an annual basis reflecting the performance of the previous year. Hence, return on 
deposit (RODt) also takes a lagged form (RODt-1) together with the overall feedback via 
the lagged dependent variables (CNCt-1 in eqn. 5; BCNCt-1 in eqn. 6). These one-year 
lagged variables are verified by interviews with banks such as Korea Housing Bank 
(KHB), Korea First Bank (KFB), and Kookmin Bank (KB) as well as FSS in Korea and 
Zenginkyo in Japan.32 All lagged dependent variables were taken to be with one-year 
lag except for the average branch network size (AVBt) where two-year lags are used 
given the nature of data.33    
Market size (MKSt) was also assumed exogenous in the model as deposit size is not 
endogenously determined in relation to the market structure measured in concentration. 
Deregulation dummy variables were considered to be exogenous since the reason for 
deregulation in East Asia lies in the outside pressure from the international 
organisations such as G7, OECD, IMF and World Bank.  
Concentration (CNCt), branch concentration (BCNCt) and average branch network 
(AVBt) are the variables determined endogenously as well as contemporaneously based 
on the number of banks, the number of branches and the concentrations in the market.  
So far the examination has focused on whether the relationships between the 
variables in the model are contemporaneous or have lagged features in constructing the 
simultaneous equations and have shown exogeneity and endogeneity. This model 
enables the testing of a variety of propositions,  
 
Structure (Concentration: CNCt, Branch Concentration: BCNCt ) 
1. the degree of concentration decreases as the market size increases with given 
set-up costs34  
2. the degree of concentration in the industry is positively related to the degree of 
concentration in branching 
3. the average branch network size is positively related to the degree of 
concentration 
 
Conduct (Deposit and loan rates: IRDt-1 and IRLt-1, Branch network: AVBt ) 
1. the interest rate on deposits is negatively related to the degree of concentration 
2. the interest rate on loans is positively related to the degree of concentration  
3. the average branch network size is positively related to the degree of 
concentration 
 
Performance (Return on deposits: RODt-1)  
1. the return on deposits is negatively related to the degree of concentration 
                                                                                                                                               
Strickland and Weiss suggested a system of simultaneous equations while Sutton claims there is no single 
specification explains all industries.   
32
 The interview with Zenginkyo took place during the visit to its office in Tokyo between 18-20 Dec. 
2000 and the interviews with KHB, KFB, KB, and FSS took place in Seoul between 26-30 Dec. 2000.  
33
 The Phillips-Perron test of unit roots were conducted for all the dependent variables on their lags and 
the number of lags were determined accordingly: one-year lag for CNCt and BCNCt and two-year lag for 
AVBt.    
34
 Traditionally, the SCP paradigm with feedback predicts higher profit levels as the market size grows 
and therefore it attracts more entrants and a fragmented market structure is established as a  
result.  
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Deregulation (Different types of deregulation: D1t , D2t, and D3t) 
1. relaxed regulation leads to a higher degree of concentration 
2. deregulation leads to higher degree of concentration in branching 
3. deregulation leads to banks with larger branch networks 
 
Traditional literature suggested that the degree of concentration would be negatively 
related to the size of the market to sunk costs ratio, assuming that the sunk costs are 
similar across the market. For example, Sutton (1991) explains, for a wide class of 
homogeneous goods models, including the Cournot and joint profit maximisation 
models, the industry converges to a fragmented structure, as the ratio of the size of the 
market to sunk costs becomes large. The larger the market size is, the more room there 
is for new entries, which leads the market to a more fragmented structure. Cerasi et al. 
(2002) showed some evidence of a negative relationship between concentration and 
market size in the banking industries in Europe. Set-up costs for the first branch are 
mainly due to entry regulation, i.e. the requirement a bank has to meet in order to 
become operative and the access costs to funds, given by the interbank market. In a 
single country case like in Japan or Korea, this assumption simplifies the empirical test 
allowing one to ignore the problem of finding a proxy for set-up costs.  
 The results from estimating the 3-equation system are reported in Table 6.  For 
the first proposition in Structure, the relationship between the degree of concentration 
(CNCt) and the market size (MKSt) is positive in Japan but negative in Korea. The 
coefficient of the market size is statistically significant in Japan but not significant in 
Korea. These contradicting results between two countries may indicate that the market 
structure does not entirely depend upon the market size. One could alternatively explain 
the reason for the contrasting results as the difference in their stage of banking 
evolution. Assuming endogenous sunk costs as Sutton (1991) suggested, Japan may be 
a step ahead of Korea in the escalation of concentration as market size increases (see 
Figure 3 and 4). The deregulation measures, which changed the competition 
environment in East Asia may explain this contradicting result.    Alternatively, the 
banking sector does not conform to standard results of other industries.    
The result for the second proposition in Structure is interesting since the sign on the 
estimated coefficient of market size (MKSt) in branch concentration (BCNCt) is positive 
in both Japan and Korea (the coefficients are 0.34 and 0.35 respectively) although 
neither is significant. The usual prediction is that when the market size increases, the 
branching network is also increases but the dominant banks expand their branch 
network even more to pre-empt new entries. Therefore the results are typical evidence 
for this type of pre-emptive and/or competitive branching activity.  
Concerning size of average branch network, the data does not support the third 
proposition in Structure. The negative relationship between the average branch network 
size (AVBt) and the market size (MKSt) in Japan can be explained by the dominance of 
Keiretsu networks (the coefficient of –0.05 significant at 10% level) which does not 
need much branching to attract large size banking business as it is mostly secured with 
the Keiretsu. On the other hand there is a positive relationship between the average 
branch network size (AVBt) and the market size (MKSt) in Korea, although it is not 
significant (the coefficient is 0.03). This difference in the results suggests that the 
banking network between Keiretsus and Japanese banks is more effective than that 
between Chaebols and Korean banks. This is an important observation as it firstly 
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indicates that the banking structure should not be looked at independent of the real 
sector. Secondly, it also helps us to understand why two countries show divergence in 
banking restructuring or if not divergence, in different stages of banking evolution.      
For the first proposition in Conduct regarding the deposit interest rate (IRDt-1), the 
results from Japan are consistent although it was significant only in explaining branch 
concentration (BCNCt). The initial proposition predicted a more fragmented market 
structure with new entries would raise deposit rates under competition and squeeze 
interest margins for a given level of loan rate.  The results do support this proposition 
and indicates that dominant banks can afford to pay relatively lower deposit rates in a 
concentrated market structure.  
However, one could probably argue that the banking conduct in the region is not 
entirely up to the market concentration and the loose competition environment in East 
Asia where industrial policies and regulation dominated the banking. It is worth noting 
that banks’ entry decision in East Asia has been less sensitive to the banking outlook 
given the industrial policy as shown in Table 2 but to banking regulation as listed in 
Table 3 and 4. Therefore, this result should not be looked at independently of changes in 
regulation, which aim for free competition. On the other hand, the results on deposit rate 
in Korea are not significant for market concentration (CNCt) nor for branch 
concentration (BCNCt).   
The second proposition in Conduct deals with loan rates (IRLt-1). Following the same 
logic as in the previous proposition, a positive relationship is predicted between the 
interest rate on loans (IRLt-1) and the degree of concentration (CNCt) for a given level 
of deposit rate as dominant banks can charge higher loan rates. The results for both 
Japan and Korean agree with the proposition and the positive relationship is significant 
at 5% level in explaining branch concentration (BCNCt).  
Once again, as free entry condition has not been common in Korea due to prevailing 
regulation and the determination of loan rates and deposit rates were predominantly 
regulated by the Korean Government in favour of its industrial policy, changes in 
interest margins do not necessarily seem to affect new entries and hence the market 
structure. Hence, it does not seem appropriate to consider interest rates on loans and 
deposits as only strategic variables in banking competition without taking regulation 
and NPL provisions into consideration.  
It is clear that increasing margins allowed more market power to the incumbent 
banks in Japan to pre-empt new entries via branching. On the other hand, the 
proposition holds in the Korean case without much significance, which suggests that it 
may need other explanatory variables over and above interest rates on loans and 
deposits.  
Regarding the relationship between the average branch network size (AVBt) and the 
concentration (CNCt), the initial proposition of a positive relationship holds only for the 
Korean case explaining market concentration (CNCt). The coefficients are negative in 
all other cases. This third proposition in Conduct is rooted in the idea that increasing 
network size in order to provide services to a bigger market may create a concentrated 
market structure. However, the results in both Japan and Korea show more or less 
evidence of negative relationship (except for the market concentration in Korea). This 
may indicate a banking inefficiency in East Asia where branch network expansion does 
not increase market share.    
Finally, the last proposition reveals a relationship between Performance and market 
structure. The Japanese data show no evidence of relationship between the 
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concentration (CNCt) and the return on deposit (RODt-1), whereas the Korean data did 
show a negative relationship between branch concentration (BCNCt) and return on 
deposit (RODt-1), which is significant at 10% level.  The result suggests that banks tend 
to leave the market or merge together to restore some power in light of falling 
profitability. More importantly, this reassures the proposition drawn from the simple 
theoretical model with NPLs, that indicates the larger the NPLs, i.e. less profitable or 
lower return on deposit, more concentrated the market is. However, there is a problem 
interpreting the case of high profitability attracting new entries, as a free entry condition 
has not been applicable in Japan and Korea given the strict regulation on licensing new 
banks and new branches as indicated in Table 3 and 4.  
It is worth noting that interest margins and return on deposits are two different 
concepts as the latter does include the risk effects of loans offered by the banks whereas 
the former does not factor in the risk returns but simply represents the interest rate 
strategy, i.e. pricing strategy. This is clear in the figures 9 to 12. Figure 9 illustrates the 
historic movement of interest rates on deposits and loans in Japan which translates into 
interest margins (solid line) in Figure 10 whilst the dashed line in the figure represents 
return on deposits. Similarly, Figure 11 shows the historic movement of interest rates on 
deposits and loans in Korea whilst Figure 12 compares the Korean interest margins to 
its return on deposits. In Japan it seems difficult to conclude any relationship between 
interest margins and return on deposits in Japan. On the other hand, there is evidence of 
stability in return on deposits in Korea (except for the 1997 financial crisis period) 
despite the fluctuation in the interest margins.             
Concerning the deregulation, it is necessary to specify which type of deregulation 
among the three (D1t, D2t and D3t) is considered in each case. The first proposition relies 
on deposit rate deregulation (D1t), which is one of the most crucial types of deregulation 
in the SCP framework as it indicates a shift from price-cap regulation to rate-of-return 
regulation. With the deregulation on deposit rate (D1t), banks are expected to compete 
more vigorously and thus created more concentrated market structure to obtain some 
market power. Similarly, branch concentration (BCNCt) was expected to increase with 
deregulation in the process of mergers and exits. However, the results do not give any 
clear sign of direction in the relationship except for the case where movements in 
average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan were explained. All three deregulation 
measures here show significant evidence for smaller branch network size. This seems to 
explain adjustments in banking activity from unnecessary branch expansion under 
regulation to more rationale and efficient branch expansion. This type of irrational 
branch expansion was not unknown when banks have to take advantage of granted 
branching licenses under strict control over branch licensing.    
Both the Japanese and the Korean data showed a negative relationship between 
deregulation on deposit rate (D1t) and the concentration (CNCt) although they are not 
significant. The negative relationship could be related to the inflexible deposit rates 
around zero in Japan and the moderate regulation in Korea. Thus, the deposit rate 
deregulation (D1t) leaves little room for East Asian banks to strategically move rates and 
thus affect the market structure. The feedback process of SCP paradigm going through 
the deposit rates in East Asia is somewhat disconnected for the above reason.  
The relationship between the deposit rate deregulation (D1t) and the branch 
concentration (BCNCt) was found to be positive in Japan whereas the Korean data show 
the opposite direction although the coefficients are not significant. The Korean case 
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should be re-examined in the future since the negative relationship could be only 
temporary given the short history of deregulation.  
It is interesting to notice that the relationship between the cross-sector entry 
deregulation (D3t) and the concentration (CNCt) in both Japan and Korea is positive, 
although not significant. One explanation can be that the cross-sector synergy effects 
lead banks to merge across the financial sector. The other explanation can be that the 
incumbent banks merge to act against the new entrants from neighbouring financial 
industries. The latter is an interesting result as it explains banks’ entry deterrent 
activities when they face potential new entrants due to deregulation.  
The relationship between the cross-sector entry deregulation (D3t) and the average 
branch network size (AVBt) was positive in Korea. The rationale behind this is similar 
to the second proposition concerning the Korean banks’ entry deterrent activities. Banks 
seem to expand their size of branch network to deter new entrants. 
However, the Japanese data indicated a negative relationship between the cross-
sector entry deregulation (D3t) and the average branch network size (AVBt), which was 
also significant. These opposite results can be looked at in parallel with the phases of 
financial sector development. Korea as an example of a less developed banking industry 
enhances pre-emptive behaviour against potential new entries from other financial 
industries. On the other hand, as the Japanese banking industry is relatively more 
mature, a lifting of cross-sector entry restriction can create synergy effects among 
various financial firms rather without expanding their branch network size.     
The average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan show several significant results for 
some variables. First, the market size (MKSt) is negatively associated with the branch 
network size (AVBt) and the coefficient of –0.05 is significant at 10% level. This 
indicates that as market size increases, the banks tend to downsize their branching 
network in Japan (see Figure 8). On the other hand, branch concentration (BCNCt) is 
positively related to the average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan suggesting that 
dominant banks’ branch network expansion increases the overall average branch 
network size. However, the results for the Korean average branch network size are 
showing the opposite signs. One could argue this is because Korean banks have not yet 
started downsizing branch network as shown in Figure 8. 
It is also important to note that the impacts of all three deregulation dummy variables 
(D1t, D2t, and D3t) on the average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan are significantly 
negative which means that the Japanese banks’ reaction towards banking liberalisation 
is to cut down their branch network size to reduce their costs and improve efficiency.    
The lagged dependent variables are all positive and significant at 1% level as 
expected indicating the substantial path dependence in banking structure.  
From a quick overview of Figure 5 and 6, it is noticeable that the Japanese banking 
has undergone a major consolidation in nationwide banking throughout the last 3 
decades with acceleration whilst the regional banks pursued a more fragmented market 
structure since 1990s. This is not so obvious in Figure 1. By contrast, the number of 
Japanese banks declined substantially in the nationwide banking whereas the regional 
banking actually had a new entrant during the sample period.  
On the other hand, the Korean banks have experienced a similar concentration path 
in both the nationwide and the regional banking heading towards a more fragmented 
market structure until the early-mid 1990s and a more concentrated market structure 
since the late 1990s. One interesting observation to make here is that the banking 
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consolidation is achieved across both nationwide and regional banking in Korea whilst 
the Japanese banking consolidation is solely due to the nationwide banking.  
The results of the Hirschman Herfindal Index measures presented in Table 7 also 
suggest that there are differences in the market structure and the banking behaviour in 
the SCP paradigm between nationwide banks and regional banks.  
One noticeable difference between the results from the concentration index 
estimation in Table 6 and the Hirschman Herfindal Index (HHI) estimations in  Table 7 
is that the market size variables (MKSt) are more noticeably significant and all positive 
in Table 7 which uses HHI. This positive relationship between concentration and market 
size variables clearly supports Sutton’s (1991) argument of escalation in concentration 
with endogenous sunk costs, which are associated with the expansion of branch network 
in banking.   
It is noticeable from Table 1 that Korea is in a different pace and stage of banking 
evolution, which indicates a large number of new entries as well as M&As in Korea in 
contrast to no new entry in Japan during the sample period. A similar conclusion can be 
drawn from Figure 4 where Korean banking concentration moves from a highly 
concentrated market (HHI > 18) to an unconcentrated market (HHI < 10) and is moving 
back up to a moderately concentrated market (10 < HHI < 18). By contrast, the Japanese 
banking remains unconcentrated (HHI < 10) even after the significant consolidation in 
the nationwide banking.35  This is mainly due to the fragmented regional banking in 
Japan.  
Therefore it is crucial to note that the two countries adopted different strategies for 
their regional banks whereby Japan took more fragmented banking structure for its 
regional banks whilst Korea took a same policy of consolidation for both nationwide 
and regional banks as presented in Table 1, Figure 5 and 6. Perhaps the overall market 
size covered by regional banks differ since Japanese regional banks tend to be larger 
compared to Korean regional banks and they tend to have more geographical monopoly 
as Japan is formed as a group of islands. On the other hand, Korean regional banks 
operate in a relatively smaller scale and are less geographically differentiated from one 
another.  
Another interesting result is that the Japanese nationwide banks show a significantly 
negative relationship between market concentration (HHINt) and deposit interest rates 
(IRDt-1), whilst regional banks show positive relationship for the same pair (HHIRt and 
IRDt-1).  
On the other hand, the signs are reversed for the loan rates (IRLt-1) whereby higher 
loan rates suggests more concentrated nationwide banking whilst lower loan rates are 
associated with more concentrated regional-banking in Japan, which is significant at 5% 
level. In other words, dominant Japanese nationwide banks seem to be able to stretch 
their interest margins under a more concentrated market structure as opposed to those in 
the regional banks cannot. Perhaps one explanation for the reversed sign for the 
Japanese regional banks is that they operate more or less as a regional monopoly and 
therefore even under fragmented market their interest margins can be stretched further 
within their respective geographical markets.     
                                                 
 
 
35
 The European Commission and the US Department of Justice classify market conditions according to 
HHI (unscaled): 1/ less than 1000 (i.e. 10 in scaled HHI in this paper) as unconcentrated; 2/ between 1000 
and 1800 as moderately concentrated, and 3/ over 1800 as highly concentrated.  
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On the Korean banking side, the results look more significant in the regional 
banking, especially the return on deposit (RODt) effects are well captured and supports 
the proposition on performance whereby lower returns i.e. larger non-performing loans 
are associated with a more concentrated market structure.  
     
5. Comparison between Japan and Korea 
Although many economists showed similarities between Japan and Korea during the 
industrialisation period after World War II, very few people tried to explain differences 
between the two countries. This empirical analysis on the banking sector adds some 
value in this context. Despite the close interdependency with respect to trade and 
industrial structure, the banking sector has shown evidence that they were taking 
fundamentally different steps towards restructuring, although the overall path of 
restructuring looks similar at first sight. 
Japan seemed to have taken a prolonged plan for restructuring compared to Korea 
where banking deregulation and restructuring has only just begun. Table 3 on Japanese 
banking liberalisation dates back to 1978 whereas Table 4 indicates the Korean banking 
liberalisation has only begun since 1991. One important point to make regarding interest 
rates is the Japanese banks cannot truly compete in interest rates as they are more or less 
bounded around zero currently. By contrast, Korea seemed to have moved faster 
towards restructuring within a short period. In this context, one could argue the 
divergence in their restructuring mainly due to the pace of restructuring and/or the 
respective stages in the restructuring time horizon where two countries stand. In Figure 
7, branch concentration (BCNCt) in both countries follows a similar path of a U shape, 
i.e. a move towards branch fragmentation until late 1980s in Japan and until later 1990s 
in Korea followed by a series of consolidation. However, the Japanese banking seems to 
have taken a longer time horizon whilst Korean banking took a drastic adjustment over 
a short period.  
On the other hand, average branch network size has taken a rather similar path until 
early 1990s and then diverged as the Japanese banking started downsizing their network 
size alongside the ongoing M&As (see Figure 8). It is an important point to make that 
the Korean banking has not downsized its branch network size although its general 
move towards concentration are revealed on the surface. This suggests that the drastic 
consolidation in Korea did not seem to have really triggered banking efficiency.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The role of East Asian banking in industrialisation was carefully discussed. To help 
understand the East Asian banking structure, the determinants of the industry 
concentration were analysed. Concentration depends on the market size for given set up 
costs as well as banks’ conduct and their performance. This recursive process is affected 
by regulation to some degree. Some of the predictions suggested by the simple 
theoretical model are also tested on a time-series sample of Japanese and Korean 
commercial banking industry.  
In East Asia, the banking concentration rises when deposit market size increases as a 
consequence of deregulation process in banking industry. Although there is no 
convincing pattern of events in East Asia supporting the prediction of the deregulation 
on interest rates, other types of deregulation such as relaxing branching restrictions and 
cross-financial sector entry restrictions have shown positive relationship with the 
banking concentration with an increasing pattern of concentration in the time path. This 
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reaffirms that banking industry structure does not conform to standard convergence 
theory in concentration with a given sunk cost. The evolution of banking concentration 
has been non-monotonic in East Asia.      
The econometric model predicts average branch network size to increase as market 
size increases, whereas deregulation leads to an expansion of the average size of branch 
network. The data support that deregulation increases the average size of branch 
network. However, there is no convincing evidence of a positive relation between 
average branch network size and degree of concentration in the industry in the presence 
of deregulation.      
The relationship between the loan rates and the concentration was significantly 
positive in Korea. However, a more important result is that Japan and Korea are not 
going through an identical path in terms of banking restructuring. This overturns most 
academic claims about similarities between Korea and Japan in their economic 
development. They might just have started a diverging path in financial sector 
development. This divergence path needs further studies.  
The impact of deregulation is measured in terms of deregulation on deposit rates, 
branching restriction, and cross-sector entry restriction. The data show that deregulation 
of deposit rates has a direct impact on concentration and branch concentration. It is also 
important to note that the Korean banks are using unambiguous entry deterrent tactics 
when they face new entrants following the deregulation on cross-sector entry within the 
financial industry.  
There are several limitations in this analysis. First of all, some of the conclusions are 
based on weak evidence due to the limited number of observations available. Another 
limitation is that the restructuring process has short history and long-term effects have 
to be further studied. However, this research exercise is still useful in discussing the 
short-term impact of deregulation on the structure of banking system. The other 
limitation is that there are differences in entry costs and therefore, the impact of entry 
costs on the banking structure can vary, when Japan and Korea are compared. I tried to 
explain the banking sector and the real sector coherently by linking the industrial policy 
development with the evolution of banking sector in East Asia. However, there is scope 
for future research regarding this link between the real sector and the financial sector.     
In this paper, I have investigated what has already happened with respect to the 
structure of banking in East Asia in relation to concentration and deregulation. Many of 
the propositions were supported by the test results both theoretically and empirically. I 
do, however, believe it is worth having a closer look at the on-going process of 
deregulation in order to predict the future banking structure in East Asia. For instance, 
alongside the mergers between domestic commercial banks, M&A activity by foreign 
banks has just started to become politically socially acceptable in rescuing distressed 
Korean commercial banks. On the other hand, Japan is expecting a significant 
consolidation not only among commercial banks but also across all the financial 
institutions. The impact of different types of consolidation will definitely be an 
interesting area for future investigation.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Changes in the Number of Commercial Banks 
 Dec-76 M&A R T A Peak Dec-03 
Japanese Banks 
(Total No. = 86) 
      
Dec-85 
 
Nationwide (22) 13 -5 -1 0 0 13 7 
Regional (64) 63 0 0 0 +1 64 64 
Korean Banks 
(Total No. = 28) 
      
Dec-97 
 
Nationwide (18) 5 -9 0 +3 +9 16 8 
Regional (10) 10 -4 0 0 0 10 6 
Source: Japanese Banks – Principal Financial Institutions by Zenginkyo, and Korean Bank Management 
Statistics by Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).  
N.B.: 
1) M&A: mergers and acquisition; R: revocations; T: transformations; A: authorisation of new entities. 
2) In case of M&As and a subsequent change of bank name for a newly merged one, it has been counted as 
only one M&A instead of counting as two M&As and an authorisation of a new entity.  
3) When a bank changed its name, the data set recorded as a new bank although it is not counted as an 
authorisation of new entity in the above table.       
  
 
Table 2. Evolution of Industrial Policies in Japan and Korea  
Approximate period Japan Korea 
1990s High-tech and service industries Knowledge-intensive industries 
1980s Knowledge-intensive (or high-tech) 
industries 
Heavy industries 
1970s Knowledge industries and heavy 
industries 
Heavy industries (steel, chemicals, 
ships, electronics) 
1960s Heavy industries(steel and ships) Light industries (textiles) 
1950s Light industries (textiles) Primary products (food products) 
 Source: Castley (1997), Korea’s Economic Miracle 
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Table 3. Japanese Banking Liberalisation: post-1978 
Liberalisation measure Date effective 
Short-term interest rates liberalised 1978 
Issuance of CD started  May 1979 
FX control eased by amending the Law Dec 1980 
Regulation on conversion of foreign currency into the yen abolished  Jun 1984 
Money market certificate created Apr 1985 
Interest rates of large amount time-deposits liberalised Oct 1985 
Investment business law enacted Nov 1986 
Overseas deposits by residents liberalised Jul 1989 
Financial System Reform Act allowed banks to enter securities business Apr 1993 
Interest rates of Time deposits liberalised completely Jun 1993 
Interest rate on demand deposits liberalised (ex. current account) Oct 1994 
Restrictions on the number of a bank’s new branches removed  Jun 1995 
Regulation on deposit products relaxed Oct. 1995 
‘Big Bang’ reform announced – PM Hashimoto’s idea of  
1/freedom 
2/fairness 
3/globalisation 
Nov 1996 
Ban on financial holding companies lifted Dec 1997 
Amended FX and Foreign Trade Law making FX transactions free from 
governmental authorisation 
Apr 1998 
Bank allowed to sell investment trust over-the-counter Dec 1998 
Restriction on trust bank subsidiaries/securities company subsidiaries 
abolished 
Oct 1999 
Bank allowed to issue straight bonds Oct 1999 
Banks, securities companies to be allowed to enter insurance business 
A new Financial Services Law to be enacted 
End 2000 
 Source: Japanese Banks 2000 (Zenginkyo, 2000) 
 
Table 4. Korean Banking Liberalisation: post-1990 
Liberalisation measure Date effective 
Short-term interest rates and interest rates on time deposits with maturity over 
3 years liberalised 
Nov 1991 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity over 2 years  Nov 1993 
Rates on strategic loans (BOK induced) were partially liberalised as the band 
of preferred rates for this category was guided by the Government  
Dec 1994 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity over  1 years Dec 1994 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity over 6 months Jul 1995 
Fully liberalised interest rates on strategic loans Jul 1995 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity below 6 months 
(completed 4 stage deregulation on interest rates: 1991-1997, earlier than 
planned)  
Nov 1995 
Allowing cross-sectoral entries within financial sector    
Banks’ securities business 
Banks’ insurance business 
 
Early 1970s 
Not Applicable 
Branching restriction still remains Not Applicable 
Source: Korean Financial System (BOK, 1998) 
N.B.:  
1) No further announcement of allowing banks to conduct insurance business as of Dec. 2004. 
2) No indication for liberalising branching restriction as of Dec. 2004  
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Table 5. Description of Variables 
Variables Type Operational Definition 
Dependent Variables  
CNCt C Banking concentration ratio indexed as ln[C5t/1-C5t ]  
BCNCt C Branch concentration ratio indexed as ln[BC5t /1-BC5t] 
AVBt C Log of average branch network size 
HHIt C Banking concentration rescaled by HHI/100 
HHINt C Concentration in nationwide banking rescaled by HHIN/100 
HHIRt C Concentration in regional banking rescaled by HHIR/100 
Independent Variables  
MKSt C Log of total deposit market size rescaled and deflated by GNP 
IRDt-1 C Market average interest rates on deposits (1-2 year time & savings) 
IRL
 t-1 C Market average interest rates on loans (3 year fixed term) 
ROD
 t-1 C Average return on deposits 
Lagged Dependent Variables 
CNC
 t-1 C 1 year lagged banking concentration ratio of CNCt 
BCNC
 t-1 C 1 year lagged branch concentration ration of BCNCt 
AVB
 t-2 C 2 year lagged average branch network size of AVBt 
HHI
 t-1 C 1 year lagged banking concentration of HHIt 
HHIN
 t-1 C 1 year lagged nationwide banking concentration of HHINt 
HHIRt-1 C 1 year lagged regional banking concentration of HHIRt 
Deregulation Dummy Variables 
D1t L/D Deregulation on deposit interest rates measured between 0 and 1: 
1=completely deregulated; 0.5: halfway through in the deregulation 
process; 0=fully regulated  
D2t L/D Deregulation of branching restriction measured between 0 and 1: 
1=completely deregulated; 0.5: halfway through in the deregulation 
process; 0=fully regulated 
D3t L/D Deregulation of cross-financial sector entry measured between 0 and 1: 
1=completely deregulated; 0.5: halfway through in the deregulation 
process; 0=fully regulated 
N.B.: Binary (B), Likert (L), Continuous (C), and Discrete (D) 
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Table 6. Structure of Japanese and Korean Banks by TSLS  
Country Japan Korea 
Dependent 
Variables 
CNCt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
BCNCt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
AVBt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
CNCt  
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
BCNCt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
AVBt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
Independent Variables  
MKSt .56* 
(.30) 
.34 
(.23) 
-.05* 
(.03) 
-.09 
(.87) 
.35 
(.40) 
.03 
(.16) 
BCNCt  
 
 .06*** 
(.02) 
  -.08 
(.05) 
IRDt-1 -7.94 
(6.52) 
-10.28** 
(5.23) 
 .03 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.04) 
 
IRL
 t-1 6.98 
(6.73) 
12.51** 
(5.50) 
 .00 
(.11) 
.05 
(.05) 
 
AVB -.49 
(.82) 
-.80 
(.65) 
 .32 
(.65) 
-.02 
(.27) 
 
ROD
 t-1 -.02 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.04 
(.07) 
-.06* 
(.03) 
.02 
(.02) 
Lagged Dependent Variables 
CNC
 t-1 0.68*** 
(.22) 
  .97*** 
(.18) 
  
BCNC
 t-1  .55*** 
(.22) 
 . 1.01*** 
(.17) 
 
AVB
 t-2  
 
 
 
1,31*** 
(.11) 
  .93*** 
(.11) 
Deregulation Dummy Variables 
D1t -.32 
(.42) 
.29 
(.34) 
-.14*** 
(.04) 
-.19 
(.47) 
-.11 
(.21) 
.07 
(.08) 
D2t .07 
(.12) 
.05 
(.10) 
-.04*** 
(.01) 
- - - 
D3t .27 
(.18) 
.12 
(.15) 
-.06*** 
(.02) 
.26 
(1.57) 
-.82 
(.74) 
.31 
(.28) 
       
Constant .27 
(3.56) 
2.28 
(2.84) 
-1.22*** 
(.45) 
-2.05 
(3.59) 
-.28 
(1.50) 
.31 
(.60) 
Obs. No. 27 27 26 27 27 26 
Adj. R2 .689 .682 .995 .895 .878 .99 
DW-h  
( )2 1χ  
.003 .138 .027 3.249 .619 .076 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 *, **, ***  t-values significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
N.B. Observation numbers vary due to the missing lagged dependent variables for years 1976 (lag 1) and 1977 
(lag 2).   
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Table 7. Comparison between Nationwide and Regional Banking Structure  
Country Japan Korea 
Dependent 
Variables 
HHIt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
HHINt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
HHIRt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
HHIt  
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
HHINt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
HHIRt 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
Independent Variables  
MKSt 2.23*** 
(.96) 
4.50* 
(2.69) 
.13 
(.10) 
4.42 
(4.09) 
5.42 
(4.60) 
5.10*** 
(1.86) 
IRDt-1 -30.86 
(21.39) 
-102.75* 
(61.74) 
3.05 
(2.14) 
.26 
(.47) 
.24 
(.52) 
.00 
(.26) 
IRL
 t-1 30.42 
(22.30) 
95.61 
(64.74) 
-4.12** 
(2.00) 
-.11 
(.53) 
-.06 
(.59) 
.24 
(.30) 
AVBt -2.87 
(2.66) 
-2.69 
(7.93) 
.03 
(.24) 
-2.50 
(2.94) 
-2.31 
(3.30) 
.48 
(1.29) 
ROD
 t-1 -.07 
(.28) 
-.53 
(.82) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.21 
(.37) 
-.16 
(.41) 
-1.25*** 
(.21) 
Lagged Dependent Variables 
HHI
 t-1 .72*** 
(.20) 
  .69*** 
(.21) 
  
HHIN
 t-1  .82*** 
(.20) 
  .82*** 
(.19) 
 
HHIR
 t-1   .21 
(.24) 
  .72*** 
(.05) 
Deregulation Dummy Variables 
D1t -.64 
(1.36) 
-3.30 
(4.00) 
-.07 
(.13) 
.25 
(2.22) 
.50 
(2.49) 
-.70 
(1.28) 
D2t .28 
(.40) 
.63 
(1.16) 
-.04 
(.04) 
- - - 
D3t .91 
(.60) 
2.87 
(1.81) 
-.17** 
(.07) 
4.93 
(8.00) 
6.27 
(9.01) 
2.35 
(4.30) 
       
Constant 12.19 
(11.78) 
9.59 
(35.17) 
1.73* 
(1.03) 
15.87 
(17.61) 
13.00 
(19.51) 
2.81 
(7.13) 
Obs. No. 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Adj. R2 .682 .858 .920 .842 .882 .962 
DW-h  
( )2 1χ  
.001 .241 .411 .157 1.173 .078 
Standard errors are in the parentheses.  
*, **, ***  t-values significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively  
N.B. Observation numbers vary due to the missing lagged dependent variables for years 1976 (lag 1)).   
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Figure 1. Japanese Commercial Banks 
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                                              Source: Japanese Bankers Association(Zengynkyo)  
 
 Figure 2. Korean Commercial Banks 
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                                                 Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
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Figure 3. Banking Concentration (ln[C5t/(1-C5t )]) in Korea and Japan 
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Figure 4. Banking Concentration (HHIt) in Korea and Japan 
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Figure 5. Nationwide Banking Concentration (HHINt) 
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Figure 6. Regional Banking Concentration (HHIRt) 
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Figure 7. Branch Concentration (BCNCt) 
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Figure 8. Average Branch Network (AVBt) 
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Figure 9. Interest Rates in Japan 
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Figure 10. Banking Margins and Returns  in Japan 
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Figure 11. Interest Rates in Korea 
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Figure 12. Banking Margins and Returns in Korea 
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
R
et
u
rn
 
on
 
D
ep
o
si
ts
 
(da
sh
e
d 
lin
e)
0
1
2
3
4
In
te
re
st
 
M
ar
gi
n
s 
 
( s
ol
id
 
lin
e)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Banking Margins and Returns in Korea
 
 
  
   
 31 
  
   
Figure 13. Deregulation on Deposit Interest Rates (D1t) 
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 Figure 14. Deregulation of Branching Restriction (D2t)  
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 Figure 15. Deregulation of Cross-financial Sector Entry (D3t) 
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